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Abstract: Pluralists about coincident entities say that distinct entities may be spatially
coincident throughout their entire existence. The most pressing issue they face is the
grounding problem. They say that coincident entities may differ in their persistence
conditions and in the sortals they fall under. But how can they differ in these ways, given that
they share all their microphysical properties? What grounds those differences, if not their
microphysical properties? Do those differences depend only on the way we conceptualise
those objects? Are they primitive facts about reality? Neither option is pleasant for the
pluralist, but what else can she say? To respond to the grounding problem, the pluralist
should rst tell a story about what material objects are. If that story explains how the
modal and sortal properties of objects are grounded, in a way that allows for differences
between coincident objects, then she has a response to the problem. That is precisely my
aim in this paper.
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1 Introduction
W
atching Anna knit, it’s clear that the scarf she’s making and the yarn
she’s making it from are different things. After all, when she bought
the yarn, no scarf existed; and she knits the yarn to create the scarf,
not vice versa. Most metaphysicians agree. But suppose she later knits another
scarf, from another length of yarn, and joins the two halves together. That scarf
has two halves, neither of which are identical to the lengths of yarn from which
they were knitted. The whole scarf is distinct from the combined length of yarn
from which it is made. But the combined yarn came into existence precisely when
the whole scarf did; and, let’s suppose, both will cease to exist simultaneously in a
terrible disaster. So we have distinct objects which nevertheless spatially coincide
throughout their entire existence: the scarf, and the combined length of yarn. If
you agree with me on this, you’re a pluralist about coincident objects. If not,
you’re a monist about coincident objects.
Pluralists can argue for their position by considering the de re modal properties
of the objects in question. The combined scarf – call it Chunky – would not
survive being unravelled, whereas the combined length of yarn – call it Woolly
– would. Chunky and Woolly differ in their properties and so must be distinct
entities. Whether one accepts this argument for pluralism (as I do) depends on
one’s account of modal predication. One might treat modal predicates like ‘could
survive being unravelled’ as Abelardian predicates (Noonan 1991), which switch
their reference when attached to different subject-position terms. This makes the
inference from ‘Fa’ and ‘a = b’ to ‘Fb’ invalid when ‘F’ is an Abelardian predicate.
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Counterpart theorists often accept this view and, as a result, reject the argument
from de re modality for pluralism.
As I indicated above, I nd pluralism to be well-motivated, independently of
the modal argument; and I’ve argued for pluralism (by arguing against monism)
elsewhere (Barker and Jago 2014). My aim in this paper is not to argue for
pluralism, but to defend it against its most serious problem. Chunky and Woolly
share all their microphysical parts. Any atom, sub-atomic particle, superstring or
whatever that contributes to the physical make-up of Chunky thereby contributes
to the physical make-up of Woolly, and vice versa. Yet Woolly can survive in
situations (such as total unravelling) which would destroy Chunky, and Chunky
can survive in situations (such as bit-by-bit replacement of parts) which would
destroy Woolly. This fact appears miraculous! What makes it the case that Chunky
and Woolly have these differing persistence conditions, if not their microphysical
parts?
This is the grounding problem for pluralists about coincident objects. It is the
most serious problem for pluralists about coincident objects. If modal differences
(including differences in persistence conditions) between coincident objects cannot
be grounded, then pluralism about coincident objects looks to be in bad shape.
How should the pluralist respond? Her options seem to be limited from the start.
Some have suggested that modal differences between coincident objects depend
on the way we conceptualise the objects in question (§3). Others have claimed
that the pluralist must take such modal differences to be primitive facts about
our world (§4). Both approaches are unappealing; and the pluralist can do much
better.
My aim in this paper is to set out (what I take to be) the best response to the
grounding problem. The response requires us to adopt a particular view of what
material objects are. But that should come as no surprise. To understand how
Chunky and Woolly are two and not one, and to understand how their differences
are grounded, we rst need to understand what Chunky and Woolly are.
The rest of the paper is as follows. I set out the grounding problem in more
detail in §2. In §3, I argue that we should not locate the relevant differences
between coincident objects in facts about our concepts. In §4 I argue that we
should not take those differences to be primitive. In §5, I assess Kris McDaniel’s
(2001) and L. A. Paul’s (2002; 2006) claim that a suitable bundle theory of objects
avoids the problem. Their approaches indeed make progress, but fall short of
being a full solution. I present and defend my approach in §6.
2 The Grounding Problem
Of the many objections that have been aimed at the pluralist, all but one are
relatively easy to shake off. The pluralist is accused of double-counting; of having
double-vision; of having an excessively proigate ontology; of being unable
to account for the identities of co-located material objects. (See, for example,
Lewis 1986; Robinson 1985; and Zimmerman 1995.) She may reply that larger
ontologies often out-perform smaller ones on key issues (and argue that hers is
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one of these cases), and hence that both her vision and basic arithmetic are ne,
thanks for asking.
The problem to which she cannot respond so easily is to explain how coincident
objects can ever differ in any respect, given that they do not differ in certain
other key respects. Chunky and Woolly are qualitatively indistinguishable in all
microphysical respects and yet they differ in their persistence conditions and the
sortals under which they fall. Chunky is a scarf, whereas Woolly, a mere mass of
wool, is not. Woolly can survive being completely unravelled, whereas Chunky
cannot. How can these differences be explained? They ‘seem to stand in need of
explanation and yet there seems to be no further difference between [Chunky and
Woolly] that is poised to explain, or ground, these differences’ (Korman 2011,
§3.1). For, according to the pluralist,
there are two objects exactly alike in every empirically discriminable intrinsic
respect, one of which has the stamina to withstand pressures and survive
changes that the other cannot. Should not two physical objects constructed
in precisely the same way out of qualitatively identical parts have the same
capacities for survival under similar conditions? (Zimmerman 1995, 87)
This is the grounding problem, as raised in various ways by Burke (1992), Heller
(1990) and Zimmerman (1995).
The general form of the problem is: how can Chunky and Woolly differ in
various ways, given that they are qualitatively identical in other ways? The ways
in question are often taken to be modal and microphysical, respectively: then, the
problem is to explain modal differences, given a lack of microphysical differences.
But the problem is not solely about how modal properties are grounded, for there
are other ways in which Chunky and Wooly differ. They differ in what they are;
they have different identities and natures; they have different essential properties
and fall under different sortals. We may but need not treat these differences as
modal differences; indeed, we may want to use these features to explain the
modal differences. Chunky and Woolly survive in different situations because
they have different natures, or different essences. But then, how are we to ground
this difference in their nature? Chunky and Woolly also differ in some of their
relational features. When I admire Anna’s handiwork, it is Chunky (and not
Woolly) I admire. I might desire to own Chunky, without having any particular
attitude towards Woolly. And were Anna to misplace her handiwork, it would be
Chunky, not Woolly, that she would miss. One could run a grounding objection
using any of these differences between Chunky and Woolly. But let’s focus here
on differences in modal and sortal properties.
The grounding problem is clearly worrying for anyone who’s tempted to think
that all of an object’s properties depend on its microphysical properties. Chunky
and Woolly differ in their properties, but not in their microphysical properties, and
so some of their properties (including their modal properties) cannot be explained
purely in terms of their microphysical properties. For that reason, the grounding
problem is equally worrying for anyone who wants to give an explanation of
modal properties in terms of non-modal properties. A modal property, such as
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being capable of being radically reshaped without being destroyed, seems to stand
in need of explanation. Why is it that the wool, but not the scarf, has this property?
One explanation might appeal to the sortals under which an object falls.
Chunky has certain modal properties because it’s a scarf ; Woolly lacks those
modal properties because it’s a mass of wool, not a scarf. Many feel that the
explanation can’t end there, however. Isn’t there something to say about why this
entity, but not this co-located, microphysically indistinguishable one, is a scarf? It’s
natural to think that something counts as a scarf because it satises certain criteria.
But then, why doesn’t the co-located, microphysically indistinguishable mass of
wool satisfy those criteria? Perhaps it’s because the criteria includes certain modal
properties. But then, we can’t appeal to sortal possession to explain those modal
properties.
An alternative explanation might start from facts about identity: Chunky is
identical to Chunky, whereas Woolly is not identical to Chunky. Whilst those
identity facts are a clear difference between the two entities, it is hard to see
how those bare facts alone could provide a satisfying explanation of their modal
differences. Why is it that being identical to Chunky gives rise to certain persistence
conditions, whereas being identical to Woolly gives rise to different persistence
conditions? (That is not to say that the strategy is hopeless. If we knew more
about what it is to be Chunky, or what it is to be Woolly, then an explanation
might be forthcoming: see §§6–7.)
One might think that there’s an easy way out of the problem, by reasoning as
follows. First (the reasoning goes), the problem is about the failure of supervenience
of modal and sortal properties on microphysical properties. And second, there
are alternative notions of supervenience according to which the modal and sortal
properties of coincident objects do supervene on their microphysical properties.
Zimmerman (1995) sketches one such notion:
one may insist that sortal properties do supervene upon the intrinsic physical
properties of things, but that an object possessing intrinsic properties sufcient
to ensure that something falls under the supervening sort may not itself be of
that sort; its having these grounding properties merely guarantees that there
is something coincident that is of this sort. (Zimmerman 1995, 88)
The notion he has in mind (call it supervenience∗) is as follows:
Supervenience∗ Property F locally supervenes∗ on properties F1, . . . , Fn iff,
necessarily, for any entity that possesses F1, . . . , Fn, there is a coincident
entity which possesses F.
This notion allows distinct sortal properties, persistence conditions and so on
to supervene∗ locally on a common set of microphysical properties. So, one
might think (along with Zimmerman) that our initial problem of grounding sortal
differences has been solved.
On reection, however, it is clear that this move does nothing to help with
the original problem. The task was to identify what, if anything, grounds the
differences between coincident objects. We want a metaphysical explanation of
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how those differences arise. Supervenience∗ merely allows us to say that such
differences supervene∗ on the microphysical. As a consequence, we can’t get the
kind of explanation we want from supervenience∗. (The same goes for other
revised notions of supervenience which are compatible with coincident objects;
Bennett (2004a) makes the case in detail.) The problem remains.
3 Conceptualist Solutions
In this section, I discuss conceptualist responses to the grounding problem, on
which ‘the distribution of sortalish properties across the world is the result of
human attitudes, concepts, and conventions’ (Bennett 2004b, 345). This approach
is a form of anti-realism about material objects: the claim is that our concepts,
and the way we exercise them, is what gives material objects the sortals they have.
Absent that conceptual activity, things do not have sortal properties or persistence
conditions. But that is just to say that, absent conceptual activity, we shouldn’t
speak of things at all; rather, there is only stuff or matter distributed in a certain
way. As Dana Goswick has it:
We are not, as the standard Realist claims, in the business of trying to ascertain
the essential natures of independently existing objects. Rather, we are in the
business of creating—given certain distributions of matter in space-time—
objects whose essential natures match our concepts. (Goswick 2010, 443)
Mark Johnson agrees with this anti-realist line, describing as ‘bogus’ the idea that
the difference between an F and its constituting matter must be a deep
metaphysical difference secured by an extra ingredient of the F. (Johnston
1992, 103)
Instead,
The crucial distinction [between an F and its constituting matter] is a
consequence of representing the world as a world of both objects and pieces
of matter surviving material change, but surviving different kinds and degrees
of material change. (Johnston 1992, 104)
The key idea here is that it is our representations, and nothing more, that make it
the case that the F and its constituting matter are two, not one.
All pluralists will agree that, whenever we have a region r in which certain
microphysical properties are present, there will exist in r distinct entities x and
y possessing distinct sortals S1 and S2, respectively. Given the microphysical
properties present in the scarf-shaped timeslice over there, for example, we nd
both Chunky, a scarf, and Woolly, the mass of wool which materially constitutes
it. If any region contained those microphysical properties we’d nd both a scarf
and a distinct mass of wool there (in our world, at least). Call such statements
pluralist conditionals. What is distinctive to the conceptualist claim is that it is
our concepts which make pluralist conditionals true.
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Bennett (2004b, §3) argues against conceptualism on two grounds. Her rst
argument goes as follows. The antecedents of pluralist conditionals specify that
such-and-such microphysical (or, more generally, ‘non-sortalish’) properties be
present in the region in question. But to evaluate such antecedents, one cannot
appeal to sortal-possessing entities as the possessors of those properties. That
would be to assume the very kind of realist position which conceptualists want
to deny. So to make sense of such antecedents, conceptualists will have to say
either that there are entities lacking any sortal properties, or else that, prior to
our conceptual activity, microphysical (or other ‘non-sortalish’) properties may
be present in a region without being possessed by any entity whatsoever. Bennett
(2004b, 50) thinks that neither option is attractive.
I agree with Bennett that the former is not an option for the conceptualist.
Conceptualists argue that we bring particular entities into being precisely by
conceptualising them in some way or other. But to conceptualise an object in
the way required is precisely to think of it under some sortal or other. Hence,
by conceptualist lights, there can be no material objects wholly lacking in sortal
properties. However, Bennett’s second option remains open to conceptualists. On
this option, prior to our conceptualisations, microphysical properties may be
present in a region without being possessed by any material object. As Goswick
says, our conceptual activity creates material objects with sortal properties, but
only against the background of ‘certain distributions of matter in space-time’
(Goswick 2010, 443), which are independent of our conceptualisations. So this
option strikes me as being precisely what a conceptualist should say.
The idea that properties may be present in some region in a way metaphysically
prior to the existence of material objects is plausible on independent grounds.
Bundle theories of material objects view properties as being metaphysically prior to
material objects. Those theories may take material objects to be bundles of tropes,
or particular instances of universals (rather than the universals themselves). I nd
such theories highly plausible, not least because they can be made to cohere well
with contemporary physics on what they take to be ontologically fundamental:
spacetime and properties, but not material objects. Indeed, I will present a (non-
conceptualist) theory along these lines in §6 as a solution to the grounding problem.
Given that this option is plausible, Bennett’s rst argument against conceptualism
is not effective.
Bennett’s second argument (2004b, 350–1) against conceptualism is that, for
conceptualism to be viable, pluralist conditionals would need to be conceptual
truths. But, she says, they are not conceptual truths:
it is neither part of my concept of a lump of clay nor of my concept of a statue
that wherever such and such non-sortalish properties are instantiated, there is
a thing that would survive a squashing as well as a thing that would not. And
it is very hard to see what other concepts could be doing the work. (Bennett
2004b, 350)
Bennett is surely right here: pluralist conditionals are not conceptual truths.
But why does she claim that those conditionals must be conceptual truths for
conceptualism to be viable? The conceptualist must claim that it is our concepts
6
that make the conditionals true; she need not claim that they are conceptual truths
(in the way that ‘all red things are coloured’ is a conceptual truth). A truth can
be grounded in our concepts without thereby being a conceptual truth: ‘there
exist concepts’ and ‘there is conceptual activity going on now’ are two such truths.
The conceptualist should claim, in the same way, that pluralist conditionals are
conceptually grounded, but not conceptual truths. If this is indeed an option, then
Bennett’s second argument against conceptualism fails as well.
It is not my intention to defend conceptualism, however. The real problem
with the conceptualist proposal is this. It is part of the conceptualist story that,
for an entity of kind K to exist, something must possess and exercise a concept of
entities of kind K. Whatever it is that possesses that concept, it must (trivially!)
be the kind of entity capable of having and exercising concepts: call it a concept
possessor for short. But for this kind of entity to exist, there must (by conceptualist
lights) be exercised a corresponding concept, the concept of concept possessor. So,
according to conceptualism, there can be no material objects unless something
has and exercises the concept concept possessor. This view rejects the possibility
of there existing only very simple concepts: concepts like predator, prey and
potential mate, for example. This seems like a very genuine possibility; indeed, it
is highly plausible that, at some point in our evolutionary past, those were the
only concepts being exercised. It was only later that we came to exercise more
advanced concepts (such as the concept concept possessor). The conceptualist’s
version of our evolutionary history must be radically different from this. On
their version, there was nothing but matter-possessing-properties for most of the
world’s history; and then, suddenly, advanced concepts and the corresponding
entities simultaneously emerge into being. I nd that version of events hopelessly
implausible.
Why is this objection not just the familiar complaint against conceptualism,
which maintains that there could have existed entities in the absence of any
concepts? The latter objection atly rejects the conceptualist’s central claim, that
it is conceptualisation that brings entities into existence by providing form to the
otherwise formless matter-possessing-properties. This objection begs the question
against the conceptualist. But the objection I ran above is not like this. It grants
the conceptualist’s central premise. The objection is not that conceptualism denies
possibilities in which there are objects but no corresponding concepts. Rather,
the objection is that conceptualism leaves no room for the existence of simple
concepts (such as the concepts predator, prey and potential mate) in the absence
of advanced concepts (such as the concept concept possessor). That’s why I reject
conceptualist accounts.
4 Primitivist Solutions
When the question was rst posed, ‘what kind of fact grounds the differences
between collocated material objects?’, the only options seemed to be these: (i)
microphysical facts; or (ii) facts about us and our concepts. If both of these options
fail, as I (and many others) think they do, then the pluralist seems to be ‘backed
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into a corner’, having to admit that the interesting differences between coincident
objects ‘are not in fact grounded in anything at all’ (Bennett 2004b, 352). This is
the primitivist response to the grounding problem (Bennett 2004b), although (as
Bennett allows) it might be more apt to call it a dismissal of the problem.
Adopting the primitivist option, in this case and in many others, is a huge
theoretical cost. Just how big such costs are, and how they should be weighed
against the costs of competing theories, is always hard to settle. Most would
accept that anyone tempted by primitivism has at least to explain how the facts
about the phenomenon in question could be primitive. One cannot simply say,
‘it’s primitive!’ and leave it at that.
Bennett (2004b) thinks that the primitivist response to the grounding problem
is the pluralist’s only option. Pluralism stands or falls with primitivism about the
possession of sortals and related properties. On her picture, the pluralist must
say the following: whenever there is a spatiotemporal region with fundamental
properties instantiated as they are in Chunky’s region, then there exists in that
region both a mass of wool and a numerically distinct scarf, which nevertheless
share all their microphysical characteristics. They differ in their sortal properties,
and consequently in their persistence conditions and in other aspects of their
modal proles. But there is no further explanation of why they differ in these ways.
One cannot reduce the fact that Chunky but not Woolly is a scarf, and hence that
Chunky could not survive unravelling (whereas Woolly could), to any further fact.
The best a pluralist can do, according to Bennett, is to explain why there
exist distinct but coincident objects possessing different sortals in that region. Her
explanation goes like this (2004b, 344–5). Any possible modal prole one can
come up with, based on the microphysical (and, more generally, the non-sortal-
related) properties F1, . . . , Fn instantiated in region r, is itself instantiated in region
r. Call this the modal plenitude principle. Since (for the pluralist) differences
in modal prole reect differences in identity, each of those modal proles is
instantiated by a numerically distinct object in region r. For present purposes, a
‘modal prole’ built from F1, . . . , Fn species whether each Fi is necessary to the
object in question. So this picture is this: for any consistent way of assigning ‘is
necessary’ or ‘is contingent’ to the non-sortal-related properties in a region, there’s
an object in that region with precisely that modal prole.
On this proposal, it isn’t a primitive fact that there are many coincident entities
in a given region. This fact is explained by the plenitude of available modal proles,
plus the stipulated fact that all such proles are instantiated. What is primitive
is which entity has which modal prole. If object x has modal prole M, then
distinct but coincident object y does not; and it’s a primitive fact that x and not y
has M. It’s primitive that Chunky but not Woolly is a scarf. The point of Bennett’s
proposal is not to explain away primitive facts, but rather to justify their existence.
(I should stress that Bennett does not commit to this view. She thinks the pluralist
has no better option, but is not herself a pluralist.)
Let me briey mention a worry for this approach. For it to offer some
justication for primitivism, the modal plenitude principle must predict that,
for any of the relevant differences we nd between coincident objects, there will
exist coincident objects differing in those ways. The worry is that not all of the
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differences we nd between coincident objects are (directly) modal differences. As
noted above, it can be that Chunky (but not Woolly) is admired, desired or missed.
And as Fine (2003) argues, a statue may be valuable and aesthetically pleasing,
whereas its constituting matter in itself is neither. For Bennett’s justication for
primitivism view to y, therefore, it must be that all of these differences reduce to,
or can be explained in terms of, their modal differences.
There is at least one difference between Chunky and Woolly which cannot be
reduced to their modal differences, however. Chunky and Woolly differ in their
essences: Chunky is essentially a scarf, and so is essentially wearable, essentially
of scarf-like shape and so on, whereas Woolly is not. (Woolly is wearable and
of scarf-like shape, but not essentially so.) These essential properties cannot be
reduced to their de re modal properties. It is de re necessary of any entity that,
if it exists, then 1 + 1 = 2; but this is not part of any material entity’s essence
(Fine 1994, 4–5). Fine’s point is a powerful one. In the present context, it severely
damages Bennett’s defence of primitivism. Some differences between coincident
entities remain unaccountable, even if one accepts the modal plentitude principle.
Although this problem is serious, it is not my primary source of dissatisfaction
with Bennett’s primitivism. Bennett’s modal plenitude principle is very plausible:
the pluralist should not say that the Chunky-shaped region is inhabited only
by Chunky and Woolly. She must also admit the existence of a great number
of extraordinary entities, coincident with Chunky and Woolly, but differing in
their modal properties. But why are there so many coincident entities? Saying
‘because the plenitude principle is true’ is not very satisfying: why is it true? For
Bennett, it’s truth is merely a stipulation, designed to make primitivist pluralism
less unappealing. But, in positing an ontology which vastly outruns our conceptual
schemes, the plenitude principle can receive no support from intuition and little
from theoretical ideology. In short, it isn’t the kind of principle which one should
merely stipulate. Rather, one needs an account of what objects are which will
entail that any material object is coincident with many others. But once one has
such an account, it is not so clear that a pluralist must accept the primitivist line
after all.
That is the line I will take in the remainder of the paper. A pluralist should
respond to the grounding problem by rst giving an account of what material
objects are which predicts – or better still, explains – the existence of coincident
objects differing in such-and-such ways. In the next section, I’ll examine one such
approach; I offer my own in §6.
5 Bundle Theory to the Rescue?
The rst theory of material objects I will discuss is a bundle theory of material
objects, which I take from McDaniel (2001) and Paul (2002; 2006). This
option offers a response to the grounding problem which has some points of
similarity with Bennett’s primitivism but which, in crucial ways, outperforms it.
On McDaniel’s and Paul’s theories, material objects are property-bundles, where
those bundles are understood as mereological sums of properties: they are wholes,
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with properties as parts. (Those properties are tropes, on McDaniel’s story, and
‘logical parts’ on Paul’s.) Both McDaniel and Paul argue that this mereological
bundle theory gives the pluralist a plausible response to the grounding problem.
I’ll argue that the response is indeed an improvement on Bennett’s primitivism,
but that it falls short of an adequate solution.
According to mereological bundle theory, a material object has properties as
parts (with ‘part’ understood mereologically). On this view, the spatiotemporal
property being in Cambridge in August, 2013 is a part of me. A material object’s
parts will include modal, sortal and other ‘sortalish’ properties, in addition to its
spatiotemporal and microphysical properties. Any pluralist accepts that properties
in the last two categories do not determine sortalish properties. So it may be that
there are material objects (qua mereological sums of properties) a and b which
overlap precisely on their spatiotemporal and microphysical parts, but differ on
their sortalish parts. This is just what the pluralist wants to say.
On this account, the modal differences between Chunky and Woolly are
primitive differences, in that they cannot be explained by or grounded in other
features of Chunky or Woolly. But now we have an explanation of that primitive
difference: they differ in such-and-such ways because they are different objects.
They are different sums of properties, and so they must differ, primitively, in at
least some of their properties. This is a basic truth about any two mereological
sums; it isn’t some feature that has been hand-written in to the theory of objects.
We might even say that, although the relevant modal differences are not grounded
in some other class of properties, they are nevertheless grounded in the identities
of the objects in question. The very identities of Chunky and Woolly, qua sums of
properties, are what ground their modal (and other) differences.
This is surely an improvement on Bennett’s primitivism. Nevertheless, the
approach faces problems. To see the rst problem it faces, note that the bundle
theorist should not claim that bundle-membership is primitive for all bundled
properties. An object that has being coloured as a part will do so because it has
some other property, perhaps being green, as a part. The part being green grounds
the part being coloured. Some of the bundled properties are derivative upon others
in the bundle: the former are in the bundle because the latter are in it. Call the latter
properties primitive parts of the bundle. (Alternatively, it may be that bundles
contain only sparse properties: mass, charge, spin and spatiotemporal properties,
for example. This is McDaniel’s (2001, 271) preferred option. Then, whether or
not x is F will depend on which sparse properties are parts of x. In this case, all
parts of x are primitive parts.)
What is the status of modal properties within a bundle: are they primitive or
derivative parts? Let’s consider what McDaniel and Paul say on the matter. For
McDaniel, tropes are sparse and ‘the job of determining what tropes there are is
best occupied by empirical scientists’ (2001, 271). The primitive part of a bundle
will be microphysical properties and relations; modal and sortal properties will be
derivative features of material objects. But, given that coincident bundles share all
their microphysical properties (and relations), it seems that McDaniel’s approach
cannot account for modal differences between coincident entities.
Paul (2006, 640–48) develops an alternative approach, based on a standard
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reductive story about modal properties. On this story, de re modal properties
are given in terms of counterpart relations, which in turn are analysed in terms
of similarities between objects. On this story, a bundle’s modal properties are
ultimately a matter of which bundles it resembles, in certain respects. Paul’s twist
on this idea is that coincident bundles share a spatiotemporal ‘core’ but differ
in resemblance-properties. The Woolly-bundle includes the monadic property of
resembling an unravelled mass of wool, whereas the Chunky-bundle does not.
It is these differences in resemblance-properties between the two bundles that
determines their modal differences.
This view does not appeal to primitive modal differences between Chunky and
Woolly. But it does appeal to primitive differences in what they resemble. This
feature of the view is hard to swallow: resemblance (in any respect) between two
bundles of properties does not seem to be a primitive matter. If two bundles
(resemblance-properties aside) are completely disjoint, with no properties in
common, then they do not resemble one another in any respect; whereas two
bundles which overlap to a very great extent will resemble one another in many
respects. In general, given any two bundles (not including resemblance properties
or relations), the facts about resemblances between them are thereby xed. So we
should not take resemblance properties to be primitive parts of bundles. But if we
cannot, then Paul’s suggestion fails.
(Paul also suggests two non-reductive accounts of modal differences between
coincident objects: one ‘primitivist’, one ‘emergentist’. The former is very similar
to Bennett’s primitivism (§4). On the latter, coincident bundles which have F as
a part may differ in that just one of them has being accidentally F as a part. In
that case, being accidentally F is not grounded in the overlapping parts of the
two bundles, and hence is a primitive part of one of those bundles. So this view
reduces to the view that (at least some) modal properties are primitive parts of
bundles and hence this view, too, is a primitivist account of modal differences.)
An alternative approach for the bundle theorist is to claim that sortal properties
are primitive parts of bundles. When there is matter arranged in a way suitable
for woolly scarfs, there exist two bundles: one containing the sortal being a scarf,
and another lacking that sortal. The presence or absence of being a scarf in
those bundles is primitive. One can then claim that the scarf-bundle resembles
other scarf-bundles (at least, in contexts in which scarf-hood is raised to salience),
whereas the mass-of-wool bundle fails to resemble scarf-bundles in this respect. In
this way, one grounds modal differences in sortal differences, where those sortal
differences are primitive.
This version of the bundle theory is an improvement on the one which takes
modal properties to be primitive parts of bundles. It’s plausible to the extent that
it’s plausible to take sortals as primitive features of objects. It’s primitive that
Chunky but not Woolly is a scarf. On this view, possession of sortal properties
explains persistence conditions and other modal properties; but sortal possession
itself has no explanation. Fixing the direction of explanation from sortal possession
to persistence conditions sounds a plausible way to go: it’s quite natural to say that
Chunky wouldn’t survive complete unravelling because it’s a scarf. Nevertheless,
I worry that this picture leaves too much in the nature of sortal properties
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unanalysed. What is it to be a scarf? What is the nature of the property being a
scarf? On the current story, we can say what being a scarf entails: namely, having
such-and-such persistence conditions and other modal properties. But beyond
that, we can’t say anything informative about what being a scarf is. That’s a cost.
There is a second problem with McDaniel’s and Paul’s mereological bundle
theories, quite apart from issues surrounding the grounding problem. (This issue
will be crucial in §6.) Their approaches accept what Barker and Jago (2015) call
the possession thesis:
Possession thesis: A material object x possesses property F iff F is a part of x
(qua bundle of properties).
Take the case of de re modal properties, understood as outlined above in terms of
the object’s counterparts. To be necessarily F is to have no counterparts that are
not F. Since being necessarily F implies being F, each thing must be a counterpart
of itself. So, for each bundle x, x must include the property being a counterpart
of x. That property’s identity is partially xed by x’s identity. But, since x is a
bundle of properties, x’s identity is also partially xed by that very property. So
we have a vicious circle of identity-xing facts.
This kind of objection isn’t specic to counterpart relations, of course. Any non-
irreexive relation will generate the problem. An instance Rxx must be analysed
as x possessing the property being R-related to x. That property’s identity is
partially xed by x, and x’s identity is partially xed by that property. And indeed,
the problem isn’t even limited to reexive instances Rxx of a relation R. The
problem arises whenever there are cycles of relation-instances: Rxy and Ryx, for
example. In that case, the x-bundle includes the property being R-related to y and
the y-bundle includes the property being R-related to x. So x’s identity is partially
xed by y and y’s is partially xed by x.
This might be acceptable for those taking a holistic approach to material
objects, where a plurality of objects may inter-depend on one another for their
identity. (Elsewhere in this volume, Naomi Thompson discusses such a notion of
inter-dependence.) The problem here is that bundle theories cannot accept this
picture. A material object’s identity must depend wholly on the properties thereby
bundled. In the case just mentioned, x’s identity depends in part of the property
being R-related to y, but that property’s identity depends in part upon x’s identity
(via the identities of y and the property being R-related to x).
In summary, the benets of McDaniel’s and Paul’s approaches are genuine,
although limited. They do not give us an adequate solution to the grounding
problem. I’ll now show how a bundle theorist can improve matters and give a full
solution to the problem.
6 Essential Bundle Theory
In this section, I want to argue for a new account of material objects, which
furnishes us with a different response to the grounding problem. This approach
incorporates McDaniel’s and Paul’s insights (§5), but avoids the problems raised
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above. The approach I favour, essential bundle theory (Barker and Jago 2015), is
an independently-motivated account of material objects, which also furnishes us
with a neat response to the grounding problem. I’ll sketch the approach and the
motivations I nd in its favour in this section, and then show how it provides a
suitable solution to the grounding problem in §7.
Essential bundle theory is a bundle theory, but one which departs from
traditional bundle theories in several respects. (I’ll provide an overview of essential
bundle theory here; see Barker and Jago 2015 for more details.) As with McDaniel’s
(2001) and Paul’s (2002; 2006) views, it adopts the mereological approach: bundles
are mereological sums of properties. The parts of bundles are particular instances
of properties, such as this bit of charge over here, not universals. Those property
instances are individuated in terms of a property-type, such as charge, and a
spatiotemporal location. One might think in terms of primitive tropes, or in terms
of universals being instantiated by regions of spacetime. It doesn’t matter which,
so long as each property instance is associated both with a property type and
with exactly one region of spacetime. (The region in question is the exact region
throughout which the property in question is distributed, hence the uniqueness
condition.) The properties in question are not restricted only to the fundamental
ones: we allow properties such as being red.
Essential bundle theory takes a material object to be a suitably closed, consistent
mereological sum of non-modal, non-sortal property instances, all of which share
the same spatiotemporal region. I will unpack the closure clause below: roughly, it
tells us that bundles containing is red will also contain is coloured, for example. The
consistency clause plays a role if we have a conception of properties on which there
are negative properties, such as not being red. No bundle contains both a property
and its negation. We exclude modal and sortal properties from bundles, because
we will analyse modal and sortal properties in terms of bundle-membership.
The region-sharing clause amounts to this: property instances P1, . . . ,Pn form
a bundle only if there is some region r such that each instance Pi is associated
(exactly) with r. This approach gives us a great deal of exibility in what counts
as a material object. We may allow the spatiotemporal regions in question to
be spatially or temporally discontinuous, and in so doing allow for spatially
discontinuous entities, like the Australian Capitol Territory. We may also allow
temporally discontinuous entities, like the person who (due to strange facts about
the continuity of her consciousness) exists only on Mondays, Wednesdays and
Fridays (Braddon-Mitchell and West 2007).
Now let us unpack the closure clause. Say that a proposition ⟨A⟩ truthmaker
entails a proposition ⟨B⟩ just in case any possible truthmaker for ⟨A⟩ is also a
truthmaker for ⟨B⟩. (Details of the logic of truthmaker entailment can be found in
Fine and Jago 2015.) Derivatively (and when ‘x’ is not free in either ‘F’ or ‘G’), say
that ⟨Fx⟩ truthmaker entails ⟨Gx⟩ when, for any particular a, ⟨Fa⟩ truthmaker
entails ⟨Ga⟩. Then a bundle b of property instances is truthmaker closed just
in case: b contains an instance of G whenever it contains an instance of F and⟨Fx⟩ truthmaker entails ⟨Gx⟩. The intuitive idea is that bundles containing, say, is
red will also contain is coloured. If there are disjunctive properties, then bundles
containing is red will also contain is red or blue. And if there are conjunctive
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properties, then bundles containing both is red and is large will also contain is
red and large. But note that bundles are not required to be downwards-closed: a
bundle may contain a determinable property, such as is red, without containing
any determinate: not is scarlet, not is maroon, and so on. In short:
Material object: A material object is a consistent and truthmaker closed
mereological sum of non-modal, non-sortal property instances, all of which
are instanced throughout precisely the same spatiotemporal region.
There is one more important feature of essential bundle theory, which sets it
apart from other bundle theories. Essential bundle theory rejects the possession
thesis (§5), which analyses property-possession in terms of bundle-membership.
In its place, essential bundle theory accepts:
Nature thesis: Property bundles specify the nature or essence of the material
object in question: object x is essentially F if and only if an F-instance is a
part of the x-bundle.
A material object’s nature is a bundle (a mereological sum) of properties, and an
object is identied with its nature. That is the simple and basic idea which gives
us both a good account of material objects and the best available response to the
grounding problem.
Let me briey sketch some of the motivations for and advantages of essential
bundle theory. First, I’m motivated by the idea that metaphysics should not make
large-scale assumptions about fundamental categories of being, which may turn
out to be contradicted by fundamental physics. Although there clearly are material
objects, it may well turn out that there are none at the fundamental level of reality.
(Indeed, given contemporary physics in terms of quantum elds, I think it’s quite
likely that fundamental reality is devoid of material objects, as we know them.)
That’s a reason to favour theories on which objects are constructed from, or
reducible to, some more fundamental category of being. Bundle theories answer
to that description, in constructing material objects from properties.
That’s a motivation for bundle theories in general but, as is well-known,
traditional bundle theories face a host of problems, including Max Black’s
notorious two-sphere scenario in a completely symmetrical universe (Black 1952).
Essential bundle theory handles the worry by taking material objects to be bundles
of property instances, rather than property types. Each such instance is associated
with a spatiotemporal region. So, since the spheres in Black’s scenario are spatially
separated, sphere A and sphere B are sums of distinct pluralities of property
instances. (This response presupposes a substantival view of spacetime. But I
already assumed this approach, in saying that property instances are individuated
in part by spatiotemporal region.)
Essential bundle theory also gives us a very natural notion of what material
objects are, given prior acceptance of bundle theory in general. There’s a very
natural sense in which, when we ask that question, we are asking about the
essence or nature of the objects in question. (Here, I am using ‘nature’ and ‘essence’
interchangeably.) Consider what Kit Fine says about the importance of the notion
of essence:
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the concept [essence] may be used to characterize what the subject [meta-
physics], or at least part of it, is about. For one of the central concerns
of metaphysics is with the identity of things, with what they are. But
the metaphysician is not interested in every property of the objects under
consideration. . . .what appears to distinguish the intended properties is that
they are essential to their bearers. (Fine 1994, 1)
Here we nd a link between ‘the identity of things’ and essences. This link is even
more explicit in Locke, who denes real essence as ‘the very being of any thing,
whereby it is, what it is’ (Locke 1690/1997, bk.3, ch.3, §15). So an essence or
nature is what furnishes an object with an identity.
A bundle theory already assigns this identity-conferring role, however: a
material object is identied with a bundle of properties. The identity of that
bundle, and hence of the object, is given by the bundle’s membership. Changing
the bundle’s membership results in a numerically distinct object. The obvious (and,
as far as I can see, only) way to reconcile bundle theory with the Lockean notion of
real essence is to treat bundle and essence as one and the same entity. This results
in a three-way identication: a material object is a bundle of properties, which is
that object’s essence. Material objects are identical to their essences, qua bundles
of properties. A material object is essentially F just in case it has an instance of
Fness as a part.
What does essential bundle theory say about accidental property possession?
What is it to possess F accidentally? To possess a property accidentally is to
possess a property not in one’s bundle. So we need to ask: what is the general
story about property possession? (The full explanation appears in Barker and Jago
2015; I will give only a brief overview here.) Let us distinguish several kinds of
material properties. First, we have those whose instances in region r are grounded
wholly by other property instances located in sub-regions of r. In this category,
we nd properties relating to mass, shape, temporal duration and so on. Call such
properties region focused. A material object o possesses a region-focused property
F iff F is instanced throughout o’s region. As a consequence, coincident objects
share all their region focused properties.
Where F is a sortal property, the story will be different. To say that something
is a person, or an artwork, is to say something about what it is: we are talking
about its essence. So we might say that an object o possesses sortal F iff F is part
of o’s bundle. But we might also require that a sortal has certain preconditions:
perhaps a person must be rational or have certain behavioural dispositions. The
bundles we identify with objects are not downwards closed, however: they may
contain a property G without containing the grounds for G. So instead, we might
analyse a sortal G into further (non-sortal) properties G1, . . . ,Gn and say that
an object o is a G iff each of G1, . . . ,Gn is part of o’s bundle. Both approaches
will entail that each spatiotemporally located person is coextensive with a distinct
physical object that isn’t a person.
We also have properties which are neither region-focused nor sortals, and
which are grounded partly by what goes on outside of their region. Jeff Koons’s
Balloon Dog possesses the property being nancially valuable, having sold for
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$58.4 million in 2014. My balloon dog, by contrast, is worthless. Facts about
Koons and his place in the art world, plus sociological and economic facts about
the art community, are what make Koons’s artefact an artwork, and what make it
a valuable one. So being an artwork and being valuable are instanced in Koons’s
Balloon Dog’s region (mostly) in virtue of artistic, social and economic properties
being instanced externally to that region. Those external properties establish
suitable preconditions for an artefact’s being an artwork, or for an artwork’s being
nancially valuable.
Crucially, these preconditions are preconditions for some object’s possessing
some property, insofar as that object falls under some sortal G. Let’s call G the
key sortal for those preconditions. Being married’s key sortal is being a person,
for example. We can associate each property F of this type with a key sortal G:
call such properties sortal focused. Now, consider some sortal focused property
F whose key sortal is G. Then material object o possesses F if and only if o is a
G (as analysed above) and F is instanced in o’s region. The idea here is that the
preconditions for something’s being an artwork focus on an artefact, and that’s
why Koons’s creation, but not the coextensive mass of rubber and air, possesses
being an artwork.
7 The Solution to the Grounding Problem
Now it’s time to return to the grounding problem. Essential bundle theory, I claim,
provides a better solution than Bennett’s, McDaniel’s, and Paul’s approaches.
(Indeed, I think the approach is the best a pluralist can do.) My claim is that, when
a material object possesses certain sortal properties and has certain persistence
conditions, it is the object itself which grounds its possession of those properties.
They are grounded in the very identity of the object in question. They are not
primitive features of the object. We can explain why a given object possesses those
very sortal properties and has those very persistence conditions. And we can do
this without positing mysterious primitive modal properties. Here’s how.
Given essential bundle theory, the grounding story of persistence conditions
goes like this. An object is a bundle of property instances, and each such property
is essential to the object in question. Chunky includes an instance being wearable
(or some similar functional property which picks out the function performed
by scarfs: being made of a material and fashioned into a form which allows us
to put them on as clothing). Those properties ground a certain modal prole,
which includes the object’s persistence conditions. Chunky’s essential wearability
grounds its modal intolerance to being completely unwound, whereas nothing in
its essence (and nothing in the essence of anything else, for that matter) rules out
small-scale substitution of Chunky’s matter.
In order to have a solution to the grounding problem, we needn’t specify the
exact manner in which an essence grounds certain persistence conditions. It is
enough to show that substantial essences (of the kind used here) are suitable
grounders for persistence conditions. The justication for that is the reasoning just
sketched. If Chunky is essentially wearable, then any condition incompatible with
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being wearable is incompatible with Chunky. Although essence (as conceived here)
is not inherently a modal notion, it of course has modal consequences. Something
that’s essentially F could not have failed to be an F; and anything entailed by being
an F will be de re necessary of that thing. Similarly, anything that’s excluded by
being an F will, of necessity, be lacked by the thing in question. Being wearable (for
scarves, at least) excludes being completely unravelled. So, of necessity, Chunky
cannot be completely unravelled without being destroyed. It is in this way that
Chunky’s essence grounds its persistence conditions.
We cannot account for an object’s de re modal properties purely in terms of
that object’s essence, however. It’s de re necessary, of Chunky, that 1+ 1 = 2; but
it’s no part of Chunky’s nature that 1+ 1 = 2. Being essentially F is sufcient, but
not necessary, for being necessarily F. Nevertheless, it’s plausible that the total
distribution of de re necessary properties should depend on the total distribution of
essential properties. Necessity ows from the essences of all things. More precisely,
if some xs are (together) essentially such that a is F, then it is necessary that:
a is F if the xs all exist. Where the xs are necessary existents, the antecedent is
automatically satised, and it will be necessary that a is F. But if there are no such
xs, then a is not necessarily F.
To illustrate the idea, suppose it’s part of the essences of the numbers 1 and 2
that 1+ 1 = 2; and suppose numbers are necessary existents. Then Chunky is such
that, necessarily, 1+ 1 = 2. Similarly, given that Chunky is essentially wearable,
every entity is necessarily such that, if Chunky exists, then Chunky is wearable. (I
haven’t said anything here about the essences of abstract entities such as numbers.
Perhaps they are bundles of properties instanced in abstract space. Perhaps that’s
why they are necessary existents. Or perhaps they have existence as part of their
essence.)
Given this principle, it follows that Woolly will lack modal properties such
as being necessarily wearable. For being wearable is not part of Woolly’s essence,
and no necessary existent has being such that Woolly is wearable as part of its
essence. We can allow that there exist relational properties such as being such that
Woolly is wearable; and we can allow that such properties are parts of bundles.
So we might accept that some strange entity is essentially such that Woolly is
wearable. But any such entity will be a contingent existent, and hence Woolly is
not necessary wearable. (We might opt for a version of the theory which bans
relational properties from being parts of bundles. But allowing for such properties
is a promising way to account for the essentiality of origins, as when we say that I
could not have had different parents.)
This principle entails a modal plenitude principle much like Bennett’s (2004b)
from §4. Any spatiotemporal region will instance many properties, and so there
will exist many consistent, truthmaker closed bundles of properties in that region.
This gives us many coincident material objects differing in their essences. Now
suppose we can consult the essences of all other entities and discover which
properties are contingent. Given some contingent property F instanced in our
region, no necessary existent’s essence will say that any of those bundles are
necessarily F. It follows that some but not all of those material objects are
necessarily F. In short, for any modal prole one can come up with, given the
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properties instanced in our region, there will be some entity in the region that
has that modal prole and another in the region that lacks it. So this approach
supports (and indeed, explains) Bennett’s modal plenitude principle. But note that
it is not the plenitude principle itself that provides the solution to the grounding
problem. Rather, the solution lies in the account of essence, that is, in the account
of what material objects are.
The sortal grounding story is similar. We might identify the sortal being a scarf
with a complex functional property F, insofar as it is possessed essentially. (F might
be thought of as a conjunction of properties such as being wearable.) Something is
a scarf insofar as F enters into its nature: x is a scarf just in case F is a part of the
x-bundle. That’s why Chunky is a scarf. And although Woolly is wearable, warm,
exible, scarf-shaped and so on, it is not essentially so, and consequently it fails
to be a scarf. Sortal differences are explained by (and grounded in) differences in
essences.
One might worry that this form of explanation merely pushes the problem
further back: essences explain sortals and persistence conditions, but what explains
essences? An essence is merely a mereological sum of property instances. So the
question, ‘what grounds x’s being essentially F?’ is equivalent to the question,
‘what grounds some F-instance’s being a mereological part of x?’ This is the point
at which explanation does not (and cannot) go any further. It is a general feature of
mereology that wholes are dened in terms of their parts: the identity of the whole
depends on having each of those parts as parts. So, given the identity of some
whole y, one cannot give an informative answer to ‘why is x a part of y?’, other
than by reiterating what y is: it’s simply the thing that has exactly such-and-such
as its parts. So the explanation of why a material object has so-and-so essential
properties reaches bedrock at an absolutely appropriate point.
In this way, essential bundle theory explains differences in sortals and
persistence conditions between coincident objects in terms of the identities of
those objects. It is not a primitivist account, precisely because it does not take
possession of modal or sortal properties to be a primitive matter. Nevertheless,
facts about a given entity’s essence are not further reducible to other facts about
that entity, on this picture. Those facts are just facts about its mereological parts,
and hence about its identity as a whole composed of parts. No one should demand
an informative answer to ‘why is x a part of y?’. The question simply doesn’t
arise; and so we have grounded modal and sortal properties – including modal
and sortal differences between coincident objects – at an absolutely appropriate
point.
8 Conclusion
The grounding problem bites hard for pluralists about coincident objects (§2).
Neither conceptualist (§3) nor primitivist (§4) approaches provide an adequate
solution. To solve the problem of how there can be coincident objects with distinct
properties, one has to give a story of what those objects are. A bundle theory of
material objects makes inroads into the problem (§5), but takes us only so far. The
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crucial move, once we have adopted a bundle-theoretic solution to the problem,
is to identify an object’s essence with what the object in question is: a bundle of
properties. When those properties are understood as property instances, this gives
us essential bundle theory (§6). We then have a suitable notion of essence with
which to ground modal and sortal differences between coincident objects (§7).
Essences themselves stand in no need of further explanation, on this view, for they
are just mereological sums of property instances.
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